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Abstract
Application inconvenience is one popular explanation for why many individuals
do not receive the social benefits for which they are eligible. Applications take time
and some individuals may decide that the financial benefits do not outweigh these
time costs. This paper investigates this explanation using cross-state variation in
administrative changes that made applying for unemployment insurance (UI) ben-
efits substantially more convenient over the past decade. We find that the intro-
duction of phone- and Internet-based claiming did not have an appreciable impact
on overall UI take-up, nor did it lead to a shift toward recipients that are higher
income or likely to be receiving the maximum benefit amount. These findings are
inconsistent with a time- and transaction-cost explanation for low take-up, since
remote UI claiming is less time intensive. This suggests that reducing application
barriers alone may not be an effective tool for increasing program participation. 
© 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.
INTRODUCTION
Participation varies considerably across most social programs in the United States
and is generally less than complete. In her extensive survey of the empirical evi-
dence, Currie (2006) finds that take-up rates for means-tested programs range from
very low (8 to 14 percent for State Children’s Health Insurance Program) to rela-
tively high (82 to 87 percent for the Earned Income Tax Credit and 60 to 90 percent
for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), with most other major social pro-
grams falling somewhere in between. Take-up of non–means-tested programs is
generally higher (nearly 100 percent for Medicare), but often far from complete (72
to 83 percent for unemployment insurance). The latter is particularly puzzling if
one expects the stigma associated with participation in non–means-tested programs
to be lower than that associated with means-tested ones. She concludes that con-
crete transaction costs—including inconvenience—must also be a major determi-
nant of participation in social programs among those eligible.
Most research on take-up has focused on monetary incentives.1 However, there 
is a small but growing body of recent work suggesting that non-monetary program
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1 For example, McCall (1995) and Anderson and Meyer (1997) find strong effects of benefit levels on take-
up of unemployment insurance. Daponte, Sanders, and Taylor (1999) find that poor information par-
tially explains food stamps nonparticipation, and poor information is most common among those whose
potential benefits are low.
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features such as application complexity, default or automatic enrollment, or man-
dated in-person interviews may also be important factors in participation.2 In this
paper, we examine the take-up consequences of the recent introduction of phone-
and Internet-based claiming for unemployment insurance (UI), which greatly
reduced the time required to file for UI benefits.3 While almost all unemployed work-
ers were historically required to initially apply for UI benefits in person, now only 13
percent do. We exploit cross-state variation in the timing of these changes to iden-
tify the effect of inconvenience on the number and characteristics of UI recipients.
The present study is most closely related to that of Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches (2007),
who find that the introduction of electronic state tax filing had a large effect on par-
ticipation in the EITC.
We find that the aggregate unemployment insurance take-up rate has increased
slightly over the past decade and a half, in contrast to the declining take-up observed
in the 1980s.4 This trend coincides with dramatic changes in the ease of applying for
benefits and, more recently, increases in benefit levels and a shift toward more edu-
cated unemployed workers. However, state-level estimates suggest that increased ease
of filing is not behind this aggregate take-up trend. The fraction of unemployed who
are on UI has no relationship to the introduction of phone- or Internet-based claim-
ing or to the closing of UI offices. This result is robust to controls for state and year
effects, characteristics of the unemployed, and the maximum benefit amount.
Regressions using estimated take-up as a dependent variable are generally consistent
with this finding, but are much less precise due to measurement error in our esti-
mates of the fraction of unemployed who are eligible for UI.
We also find little evidence of a shift toward higher-wage claimants resulting from
reduced UI application time, as a time-cost explanation for low take-up would pre-
dict. The introduction of phone claiming had no effect on the fraction of claimants
receiving the maximum benefit, the average and distribution of pre-unemployment
wage, or claimant education. The only exception to this pattern for Internet claim-
ing is an increase in the proportion receiving the maximum benefit when Internet
claiming is introduced. The primary effect of the introduction of remote claiming
technology was to reduce states’ payroll costs, but with no effect on the number or
pool of UI participants. This finding leaves incomplete UI take-up an unresolved
puzzle. Incomplete information about eligibility and application processes, rather
than application inconvenience, are possible unexplored explanations that should
be examined in future work.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents recent trends in UI
participation and provides background on UI claiming procedures in the U.S. Sec-
tion 3 describes our data and empirical approach. Results are reported in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2 In their survey, Remler, Rachlin, and Glied (2001) highlight the importance of non-monetary program
features to take-up. Currie and Grogger (2002) find that Medicaid administrative reforms did not
increase use of prenatal services, but non-monetary design features do seem to be important to SCHIP
participation (Bansak & Raphael, 2006; Wolfe & Scrivner, 2005). Ketsche et al. (2007) find that stigma
is one channel through which the effect of non-monetary program features may operate. Currie and
Grogger (2001) and Hanratty (2005) find that longer recertification intervals and reductions in state cer-
tification requirements increase food stamp participation. In the area of retirement savings, see Madrian
and Shea (2001) on the importance of automatic/default enrollment and Saez (2009) on the importance
of program framing.
3 Needels et al. (2000) report results from claimant surveys that suggest considerable time savings. Marcus
and Frees (1998) report results from a nationwide survey of 2,773 claimants, in which respondents esti-
mated that it took 11 minutes to file an initial claim by telephone and 61 minutes to file in person.
4 See Blank and Card (1991) for UI take-up trends in this earlier period.
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BACKGROUND
Aggregate Trends in Unemployment Insurance
The federal–state UI program provides income support during spells of unemploy-
ment to workers in almost all sectors of the economy. Most of the research on UI
participation is motivated by three features: (1) low levels of participation among
those eligible; (2) large cross-state differences in participation; and (3) long-term
declines in participation, particularly in the early 1980s. Two supplements to the
Current Population Survey (CPS) in 1989 to 1990 and 1993 asked unemployed
workers whether they had applied for UI benefits and, if not, why not. As summa-
rized in Wandner and Stettner (2000), the most common reason for non-application
was perceived ineligibility (mostly due to insufficient work hours, earnings, and
quits) and optimistic job expectations.5 Responses suggestive of lack of information
(“Didn’t know about UI or how to apply”), inconvenience (“Too much work or has-
sle”), or stigma (“Too much like charity or welfare”) were relatively rare.6
There is also considerable variation in UI participation across states and regions.
Vroman (2002) investigates the sources of this variation and concludes that low par-
ticipation is linked to high rates of misconduct determination and frequent eligibil-
ity determination by states. Unionization and the prevalence of employer-initiated
claims also tend to increase UI participation (Budd & McCall, 1997, 2004).
There has also been a fair amount of attention paid to the decline in aggregate UI
participation over the past half-century, particularly in the early 1980s. Blank and
Card (1991) conclude that none of this recent decline is due to changes in eligibil-
ity. Instead, changes in the regional distribution of unemployment from high to low
take-up states and declines in unionization explain most of the recent decline in
participation. Anderson and Meyer (1997) conclude that changes in the tax treat-
ment of UI benefits account for most of the decline not explained by Blank and
Card (1991).
In contrast to declines observed in the 1980s, we estimated that the aggregate UI
take-up rate has increased slightly over the past decade and a half. Figure 1 plots
our estimates of the fraction of unemployed workers that are eligible for UI, the
fraction that are receiving UI benefits, and the implied take-up rate from 1989 to
2006 (the construction of these measures is described in a later section). Fraction
eligible and fraction on UI generally trend together—increasing during recessions
and falling during recovery. The gap between these series narrowed during the
1990s, particularly during the 2001 recession, increasing the take-up rate.
Coincident with this take-up increase, states made it much less burdensome to
apply for UI benefits. Figure 2 plots the fraction of all initial UI claims that were
filed using various methods from 1989 to 2006. Though nearly all initial claims for
benefits were made in person in 1990, by 2006 only 13 percent were. More than half
of all initial claims are now made over the phone and more than 30 percent are filed
online. While suggestive of a relationship between claiming ease and participation,
this interpretation is obscured by changes in program generosity and the charac-
teristics of unemployed workers during this period. Figure 3 plots the average 
maximum weekly benefit amount UI recipients are eligible for and the fraction of
unemployed workers that have a bachelor’s degree over time. UI generosity grew
gradually during the 1990s and jumped considerably after 2000. The composition
5 Unfortunately, actual eligibility determination was not possible because survey respondents were not
matched to administrative data. It was therefore not possible to assess whether self-reported perceived
ineligibility was accurate.
6 These findings are similar to tabulations we have conducted for the May 2005 CPS supplement among
non-filers for UI. Of 3,511 non-filers included in the supplement, 1,899 reported “did not think eligible”
as a reason for their decision to not file. In contrast, only 85 survey participants reported “too much
work” and only 35 reported “too much like charity” as a reason.
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Figure 1. Aggregate Participation in Unemployment Insurance.
Sources: Fraction of unemployed on UI is from DOL administrative records,
and fraction of unemployed eligible for UI is estimated by the authors using the
March CPS. See text for details on eligibility imputation. Take-up is the ratio
between these two variables. These measures were constructed at the state-year



























Figure 2. Unemployment Insurance Claiming Method.
Sources: Authors’ calculations using BAM data. See text for details. Fractions
were constructed at the state-year level and aggregated to the U.S. using num-
ber of UI claimants as weights.
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of unemployed workers also shifted, with the 2001 recession bringing more edu-
cated workers into the ranks of the unemployed. These aggregate changes in
program generosity and the characteristics of the unemployed (and potential UI eli-
gible), both of which may affect UI participation, motivate the cross-state analysis
that follows.
Changes to UI Claiming Procedures
Since the program’s inception in 1935, most workers who lost their jobs visited
state-run local UI offices to file their initial claim, certify that they were available
for work, and confirm that they were actively seeking employment.7 In the mid-
1990s, however, states began to implement procedures for recipients to receive ini-
tial UI claims over the telephone, and many began to close UI offices. The receipt
of claims over the Internet soon followed. Figure 2 masks considerable cross-state
variation in timing of these policy changes which are important for our empirical
approach. We use cross-state variation in the timing of these policy changes to iden-
tify the effect of inconvenience on take-up rates. Figure 4 plots the cumulative num-
ber of states by year that have introduced telephone and Internet claiming or have
closed UI offices. Colorado was the only state to offer phone initial claiming for the
first half of the 1990s, followed by Wisconsin in 1995 and Massachusetts and Cali-
fornia in 1996. Phone claiming quickly took off, and by 2005, 40 states accepted UI
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Figure 3. Changes in UI Generosity and Characteristics of the Unemployed.
Sources: Maximum benefit amount ($2003) is from the DOL ETA Significant
Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws. Fraction of unemployed
with a BA is from authors’ calculations from the March CPS. Both were esti-
mated at the state-year level and aggregated to the U.S. using the number of
unemployed workers as weights.
7 Due to the remote nature of many of its communities, Alaska has long permitted individuals to file UI
benefits through postal mail.
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lag—by the elimination of initial claims takers at UI offices. Internet claiming,
introduced widely in 2000, was nearly as common as phone claiming by 2005.8
Cost reduction and improved customer service were the primary motivations for
states’ implementation of telephone and Internet claiming. In their survey of seven
early telephone claims adopters, Needels et al. (2000) found that state UI adminis-
trators switched from in-person filing at local UI offices to telephone claiming to
reduce administrative costs and improve customer service. Kenyon et al. (2003)
found that cost savings, improved efficiency, and convenience (extended hours and
reduced wait time) also motivated the adoption of Internet claiming. The adoption
of both forms of remote claiming technology were partially fueled by the availabil-
ity of grants from the U.S. Department of Labor to implement these technologies,
and almost all states took advantage of this funding source.
Since cost savings was a primary motivation, most states closed local UI offices
(eliminating in-person filing) after the introduction of telephone claiming and
instead provide dedicated on-site telephones or Internet access (or both) at local
one-stop centers to use for claims filing.9 Most states make use of interactive voice
response technologies to automate part of the initial claims process, and four of the
seven profiled states offer toll-free numbers. Our interviews with many state UI
offices suggest that phone claiming may have improved linguistic accessibility
because most states utilized phone translation services. How these changes have
affected access to job information and re-employment services is not clear, though
8 The adoption of telephone and Internet technology for continuing claims, which usually preceded ini-
tial claims, may also have altered states’ ability to assess whether current claimants are actively looking
for work. However, Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Deschenes (2005) find that increased monitoring of job
searches has no effect on the duration of continuing claims, so less monitoring should not increase dura-
tions. Additionally, we do not expect the adoption of automatic continuing claims to alter convenience
much, since many continuing claims were filed via postal mail (a convenient method) prior to the adop-
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Figure 4. Cumulative Number of States with Policy Change.
Sources: Constructed by authors from various sources. See Data and Empirical
Approach section of text for details.
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interviews in a recent GAO report (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005)
suggest it has not been diminished.
Important for the interpretation of our findings is whether phone and Internet
claiming is more convenient than in-person claiming, since most states elimi-
nated the in-person filing option following the introduction of telephone claim-
ing.10 As reported in Needels et al. (2000), customer satisfaction surveys in Maine,
Massachusetts, Missouri, and Wisconsin suggest that claimants overwhelmingly
prefer telephone to in-person claiming. In these states, 86 to 96 percent of respon-
dents, half of whom are former in-person filers, report that telephone claiming is
easier, more convenient, or faster.11 The case of Massachusetts is also illustrative.
Despite being given the option to file in person, only 11 percent of individuals chose
to do so in 2003. Kenyon et al. (2003) report that claimants seem to be even more
satisfied with Internet-based claiming due to its convenience and speed.12 Though
far from conclusive, these anecdotes suggest that remote claiming methods are
overwhelmingly preferred to in-person methods.13
Figures 5 and 6 examine which baseline factors predict when states implemented
remote claiming. Figure 5 plots year of policy change by four different demographic
characteristics from the 1990 Census. Phone claiming was implemented earlier by
states with higher household income, more educated populations, and fewer
minorities. Surprisingly, rural states who presumably have the greatest to gain from
remote claiming were late adopters. There is much less variation in the timing of
Internet adoption, but the adoption pattern is similar: Higher income, education,
and urbanization all predict earlier adoption.
Figure 6 repeats this analysis for four baseline labor market and UI program char-
acteristics. Early adoption has only weak correlation with low unemployment, but
is positively correlated with UI benefit generosity. The bottom panels show the cor-
relation between adoption and measures of UI program coverage. States in which
more unemployed workers were eligible or receiving UI (or both) in 1990 were
more likely to introduce phone and Internet claiming earlier. Since timing of adop-
tion was clearly not random among the states, our difference-in-difference
approach controls for fixed differences in take-up between states.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH
We construct a panel data set of states (plus the District of Columbia) for the years
1989 to 2006 from several different sources. Information on UI claimants is from the
Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) program, administered by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor. BAM is designed to measure the accuracy of paid and denied UI
claims and determine the source of any inaccuracies to improve UI administrative
10 At the time of this paper, there are no states that currently receive UI initial claims via the Internet
exclusively.
11 In a nationwide survey of 2,773 claimants, Marcus and Frees (1998) report that respondents estimated
it took 11 minutes to file an initial claim by telephone and 61 minutes to file in person. A similar picture
of considerable time savings from telephone claiming was also found in surveys of claimants in San
Diego (2.33 hours in person to 14 minutes via phone) and Colorado (3.4 hours to 1.7 hours).
12 The time savings (in minutes) were 19 for Colorado, 9 for Utah, and 7 for Washington relative to fil-
ing a claim over the phone.
13 As one anonymous reviewer noted, the precise magnitude of the improvement in filing convenience is
important for interpretation, but is ultimately unknown because the time reductions documented in
claimant surveys may over- or understate the true change in convenience. For instance, the surveys may
not factor in the hassle of collecting all the information needed for eligibility determination, irrespective
of claiming technology, overstating the convenience increase. Alternatively, if there is an added hassle of
waiting in line and dealing with claims takers at the office relative to applying from the comfort of home,
time reductions will understate the increased convenience. Despite these caveats, our approach will still
provide a credible evaluation of the impact of phone and Internet claiming systems on program partic-
ipation, which should be of policy interest in and of itself.
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processes. BAM samples approximately 400 UI claimants per year in each state.14
Important for our purposes is that claiming method (in person, phone, mail, Inter-
net, through employer) is recorded for each person in the sample. From this data,
we estimate the fraction of UI claimants using each method in each state for every
year and also measures of UI claimant characteristics (fraction at maximum bene-
fit amount, pre-unemployment wages, and education).
Administrative data on the number of initial claimants, average duration on UI,
number of weeks compensated and claimed, average weekly benefit amount, and
several other measures of UI utilization were obtained from the Department of
Labor Employment and Training Administration, quarterly by state. Program rules
and regulations (such as the maximum benefit amount), the unemployment rate
and the number of individuals unemployed, employed, and in the labor force were
obtained from the same source. We construct two measures of UI program partici-
pation: weeks compensated per unemployed person and weeks compensated per
UI-eligible unemployed person. Our method for estimating eligibility is described
below. Finally, from the March CPS we obtain characteristics of the unemployed
population in each year, which we use as control variables in our regression analy-
sis. All nominal values for earnings, wages, and benefit amounts are converted to
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Figure 5. Baseline Demographic Predictors of Policy Timing.
Sources: State demographic information is from the 1990 U.S. Census. Year of phone and Internet
claiming introduction was constructed by the authors from various sources. See text for details.
14 Since the sample is drawn from all claims in a given week, BAM overrepresents claimants with long
durations. That is, they are weighted by weeks claimed. We also construct weights for the BAM sample
using basic demographic information on the universe of all UI claimants also collected by the U.S. DOL
to ensure that our BAM sample matches the race-gender composition of claimants in each state-year.
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Dating Policy Changes
We identified the year in which states first offered phone claiming, first offered
Internet claiming, and first closed UI offices (eliminating in-person claiming) using
three complementary approaches. Identifying the conceptually appropriate date of
implementation is complicated by the fact that some states piloted the initiatives in
a few locations or gradually phased in implementation across the state, or both. Our
primary analysis relies on policy dates inferred from sharp changes in trends in the
methods used to file UI claims. For each state, we identified the year that the share
of claims filed via phone (or Internet) accelerated by the greatest amount and desig-
nated it the event year.15 This approach allows us to account for both slow phase-in
and the presence of special-case individuals filing by phone prior to its widespread
implementation.16 Putting an exact date on office closure is also complicated by the
gradual geographically based phase-in of many of the closures. We used the first
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Figure 6. Baseline Labor Market Predictors of Policy Timing.
Sources: Unemployment rate is from the 1990 U.S. Census. State maximum benefit amount is from
the DOL ETA. Fraction of unemployed on UI was calculated by the authors from administrative
sources. Fraction of unemployed workers eligible for UI was estimated by the authors from the March
CPS. Year of phone and Internet claiming introduction was constructed by the authors from various
sources. See text for details.
15 We calculated the absolute increase in the fraction of people using a filing method each year and deter-
mined the year in which this rate of growth increased the most. We restricted it to years where this max-
imum acceleration exceeded 5 percentage points and where the share was increasing, to prevent falsely
recording minor blips as policy changes.
16 Most states accepted some applications over the phone in the case of very special circumstances prior
to the widespread implementation of phone claiming for all individuals.
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To verify our assignment of policy timing, we also contacted and interviewed 23
state UI offices directly, obtaining the dates of these three changes (if any) and some
qualitative information about the process (that is, motivation and roll-out). We sup-
plemented this information for six states using the dates reported in Needels et al.
(2000) and from press releases.17 Our third approach involves identifying the year
that phone or Internet claims exceed certain threshold of all claims. In this
approach we designate the phone and Internet claiming year to be the first year that
each method exceeded 5 percent of all claims. The office closing year was the first
year that in-person claims dropped below 10 percent.
The dates for each of these events for each state using the first two methods
(imputed and interviews) are reported in Appendix Table A1.18 Overall, the imputa-
tion seems to do a good job of capturing policy event dates: The correlations
between imputed and interview-derived event dates (for adopting states) are 0.95,
0.64, and 0.95 for phone claiming, Internet claiming, and office closure, respec-
tively. We do not view the interview-derived dates as necessarily more preferable for
quantifying the importance of time costs. If states implemented Internet claiming
without advertising it or working out system kinks, then low initial utilization of
Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Measures of Participation
Fraction of unemployed on UI 0.36 0.11 0.15 0.76
Fraction of unemployed eligible for UI 0.47 0.10 0.19 0.79
Estimated UI take-up rate 0.79 0.27 0.26 2.04
Characteristics of UI Recipients
Percent college degree 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.49
Percent at max benefit amount 0.24 0.16 0.00 0.91
Average pre-unemployment hourly wage 13.83 2.19 9.17 21.82
UI Policies and Claiming Method
Max benefit amount ($100) 3.14 0.67 1.35 5.24
Post-phone 0.34 0.47 0.00 1
Post-Internet 0.17 0.38 0.00 1
Post close UI offices 0.26 0.44 0.00 1
Percent claims filed in person 0.65 0.40 0.00 1
Percent claims filed over phone 0.23 0.35 0.00 1
Percent claims filed over Internet 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.99
Percent claims filed postal mail 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.86
Percent claims filed by employer 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.37
Percent claims filed other method 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.53
Characteristics of the Unemployed
Average age (10) 3.10 0.36 1.90 4.50
Percent female 0.42 0.08 0.18 0.72
Percent nonwhite 0.25 0.19 0.00 0.91
Percent college degree 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.40
Average weeks worked last year (10) 2.55 0.37 1.31 3.76
Average weeks looking for work (10) 1.54 0.45 0.52 3.13
Average earnings in previous year ($1000) 10.98 4.10 3.33 35.53
Notes: There are 918 state  year observations, corresponding to 51 states (including D.C.) and 18
years (1989 to 2006). Statistics are unweighted. All dollar variables are in 2003 dollars.
17 We attempted to interview all states that were not profiled in Needels et al. (2000), but were able to
speak with an administrator knowledgeable about the UI filing changes in only half of them.
18 All appendices are available at the end of this article as it appears in JPAM online. Go to the publisher’s
Web site and use the search engine to locate the article at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/
jhome/34787.
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remote claiming implies negligible reduction in inconvenience. Our preferred
analysis relies on policy events that had large and sudden impacts on the methods
workers used to file a UI benefit claim.
Estimating Eligibility
In order to examine take-up among those eligible (rather than total participation),
we follow Blank and Card (1991) and estimate the fraction of unemployed persons
who are eligible for unemployment insurance in each state and year using data
from the March CPS.19 Unemployed persons are deemed ineligible for five reasons:
(1) current duration less than the required waiting period; (2) current duration
exceeds the maximum; (3) quit last job; (4) not in a covered sector; and (5) insuffi-
cient base period earnings. We use earnings in the previous calendar year as our
approximation of base period earnings.
Take-up is calculated as the ratio of the fraction of unemployed persons receiving
UI (from the DOL) to the estimated fraction that are eligible. It should be noted that
since eligibility is measured with considerable error, our take-up rates sometimes
exceed 1 (in fact, the maximum in our data set is 2). This partly reflects systematic
labor market differences between states. Alaska, for instance, has many migrant oil
field workers and always has a very high estimated take-up rate because many peo-
ple live outside the state (in the CPS) but claim UI benefits from Alaska (where they
work). State fixed effects will net out these fixed differences across states. Appendix
Table A220 presents the correlation between the fraction of unemployed who are on
UI with our estimate of the fraction of unemployed who are UI eligible, by state and
year. Overall, this correlation is 0.26, which should be much closer to one if eligi-
bility were accurately measured.
Empirical Approach
We utilize cross-state variation in the timing of changes to UI claiming procedures
to assess the importance of convenience to UI program participation. States imple-
mented phone- and Internet-based UI claiming at different times or sometimes not
at all. This permits us to identify treatment effects separately from aggregate year
effects and unobserved state characteristics, both of which may also influence take-
up and claimant composition. We estimate the following simple reduced form
model using weighted least squares with the number of unemployed persons in the
state-year as weights:
yi,t  a0  apPostPhonei, t  anPostNeti, t  acPostClosei, t
 Statei  Yeari  abBi, t  axXi, t  ei, t
(1)
where PostPhonei,t, PostNeti,t, and PostClosei,t are indicators for whether the obser-
vation is after the policy change. Program characteristics such as the maximum
weekly benefit amount are captured by Bi,t, and the characteristics of the unem-
ployed population are captured by Xi,t. The error term ei,t represents unmodeled
determinants of take-up. The parameters of interest are ap, an, and ac, which can be
interpreted as the effect of having adopted remote UI claiming sometime in the past
on UI take-up in the current period. We assume these effects to be constant across
states and over calendar time. When a full set of state and year effects is included,
these parameters are estimated on policy changes within states over time, net of any
19 We are grateful to Brian McCall for generously sharing his code on UI eligibility regulations.
20 All appendices are available at the end of this article as it appears in JPAM online. Go to the publisher’s
Web site and use the search engine to locate the article at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/
jhome/34787.
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aggregate yearly changes in UI take-up common to all states. Fixed differences in
the levels of UI take-up across states will be absorbed into state fixed effects. Any
aggregate correlation between policy changes and take-up, such as increased take-
up during the 2001 recession, which coincided with the introduction of Internet
claiming, will be absorbed into aggregate year effects. In equation (1), the unob-
served counterfactual is implicitly estimated from individual state-level effects
(identified by pre-event observations) and aggregate time trends (identified by con-
trol states with no policy changes).21
There has been recent attention paid to the consistency of standard errors in
regression frameworks similar to ours due to the possible within-state serial correla-
tion of outcome and policy variables. Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan
(2004), we allow for an arbitrary variance–covariance structure by estimating a
clustered robust covariance matrix (for example, clustered by state). We also utilize
a nonparametric permutation test that assigns placebo patterns of treatment status
to states and uses the empirical distribution of estimated coefficients from many of
these placebo treatments for inference.
We can foresee at least three challenges to our identification strategy. First, states
may have implemented other reforms that may also affect take-up (for example,
expanded outreach) concurrent with changes to claiming methods. Depending on
the nature of the reform, omitted variable bias may over- or understate the true
causal effect. Our review of the literature and discussions with state UI adminis-
trators did not reveal any concurrent policy changes, but this cannot be entirely
ruled out.22
A second problem is policy endogeneity. State administrators may adopt more
automated claiming methods in response to higher anticipated demand placed on
program resources due to higher anticipated take-up. If so, our estimates will be
biased upwards. We address this concern by estimating “event study” models with
leading and lagging treatment indicators, so we can observe pre-event trends in the
outcome variables. To implement this, we estimate the following model using
weighted least squares, again using number of unemployed persons as weights:










 Statei  Yeari  abBi, t  axXi, t  ei, t
(2)
where PhoneEventsi, t is an indicator for time relative to the introduction of phone
claiming. PhoneEventsi, t equals 1 if state i implemented phone claiming in period 
t – s (where s can be positive or negative), and 0 otherwise. NetEventsi, t and
CloseEventsi, t are defined similarly. Coefficients on the policy event time indicators,
asp measure the differences between actual and predicted outcomes in the current
period, having implemented the policy s years earlier (if s  0). For instance, a0p is
the take-up increase during the first year phone claiming was introduced relative to
it not being implemented. These are the parameters of interest.
A third concern with our research design is power. If the time cost savings asso-
ciated with filing method changes are low relative to expected UI benefits or other
transaction costs such as repeated eligibility determination, then our analysis may
provide only a low-power test of the time cost hypothesis. If application time is valued
21 As one anonymous reviewer noted, the inclusion of unrestricted year fixed effects may reduce the
power of our test since many states implemented remote filing in a short span of time. Post-treatment
year effects are thus mostly identified by non-adopters. However, Figure 1 suggests that aggregate trends
in participation are substantial, so we prefer models that control for unrestricted year fixed effects to
those that do not.
22 See Needels et al. (2000), Kenyon et al. (2003), and U.S. GAO (2005) for discussions of the implemen-
tation of remote claiming technologies.
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at the hourly wage rate and expected unemployment durations are long, then the
time cost reductions may represent only a small equivalent benefit increase for the
average worker. However, the time savings will be proportionately much more valu-
able for high-wage workers with low expected benefit durations.23
This concern underscores the importance of testing for heterogeneous effects.
Also, we believe that initial application is much more burdensome than filing sub-
sequent claims since the latter can be filed automatically over the phone, but this
assumption has not been tested. Even with these limitations, our approach will still
provide an unbiased estimate of the reduced-form effect of filing method on par-
ticipation, which may be of policy interest of its own right.
RESULTS
Effects on Claiming Method and Administrative Costs
Though some states phased in phone claiming over time, on average adoption was
rapid. Figures A1 to A3 in the Appendix24 plot the fraction of claims filed in person,
by phone, and over the Internet separately for each state. To characterize the aver-
age pattern of adoption across all states, we first estimate equation (2) using the
fraction with each filing method as dependent variables and plot the coefficients in
Figure 7. The regressions include a full set of state and year dummy variables but
no other covariates. Conceptually, this procedure realigns the graphs in Figures A1
to A3 around a common vertical line at the time of each policy event to create a
common “event time” relative to the event. The plotted coefficients asp and asn are the
average deviation of each plot from the zero horizontal axis for each “event time”
period. The top panel does not include indicators for office closure.
The estimates suggest that phone claiming grew to account for half of claims
within two years of implementation, drawing almost exclusively from in-person
claims (rather than employer-initiated, mail, or other methods). Internet claims
also grew rapidly, mostly substituting for telephone and in-person claims. Including
indicators for time relative to office closure (bottom panel) does not change the gen-
eral pattern. Even when people retain the option of filing in person, the growth of
phone and Internet claiming is still very rapid.
Cost reduction was one central motivation for states’ move toward remote claim-
ing. According to Needels et al. (2000), states believed that centralized call centers
would allow them to realize economies in staff, office space, and training while
making claiming easier for clients. They found that some states experienced a
reduction in costs, while others did not. In some states, reductions in personnel and
office space rental costs were offset by increases in communication and equipment-
related costs. Kenyon et al. (2003) conclude that cost savings, improved efficiency,
and convenience (extended hours and reduced wait time) also motivated the adop-
tion of Internet claiming and that these improvements were achieved in the six
states they studied.
To assess whether the policies had the intended effects on administrative costs,
we collected data on employment and payroll from the Annual Survey of Govern-
ment Employment and Payroll collected by the U.S. Census. Administration of the
23 A two-hour application time reduction is equivalent to a 1 percent expected benefit increase, assum-
ing 40 hours worked per week, a 40 percent replacement rate, and 14 weeks expected duration. However,
the effect is much larger for those with lower expected durations (for example, 6 percent for a two-week
duration). Given participation elasticities from Anderson and Meyer (1997) of 0.46 to 0.78, our state-level
analysis may not be able to pick up the implied effects on participation if expected durations are high.
We thank Patricia Anderson for suggesting this calculation.
24 All appendices are available at the end of this article as it appears in JPAM online. Go to the publisher’s
Web site and use the search engine to locate the article at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/
jhome/34787.
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federal–state unemployment compensation system is the primary component of
expenditure function code 22, “Social Insurance Administration.”25 The data
exclude benefits paid through the UI program and activities funded by federal job
training programs. Table 2 presents estimates of equation (1) (excluding covariates)
using employment and payroll costs as the dependent variables. The introduction
of remote claiming in conjunction with office closure substantially reduced employ-
ment and payroll. Phone and Internet claiming on their own (without office clo-
sure) have no independent effect on employment costs. Also, these changes were
not brought about by a shift toward more part-time employment. In fact, Internet
claiming was associated with lower utilization of part-time staff. Figure 8 depicts
the coefficients (and 95 percent confidence intervals) from event study estimates of
log payroll, without indicators for office closure. Payroll fell approximately 2 years
after the introduction of phone claiming, but the introduction of Internet claiming
did not have an appreciable impact on administrative costs.
Effects on Aggregate Take-up
Table 3 presents our main results for aggregate take-up, using fraction of unem-
ployed workers on UI as the dependent variable and weighting each state–year
25 The total employment and payroll of the California Employment Development Department, whose pri-
mary task is administration of the UI program, accounts for about half of the employment and payroll
reported for “Social Insurance Administration” in California (California Department of Finance, Salaries
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Figure 7. Speed of Adoption after Policy Change.
Notes: Graphs plot coefficients from WLS estimates of equation (2) without controls for covariates. See
text.
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Figure 8. Effect of Claiming Procedures on State Government UI Payroll Costs.
Notes: Graphs plot coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from WLS estimates of equa-
tion (2) without controls for covariates or indicators for office closure. See text. Payroll data are
from the Annual Survey of Government Employment and Payroll from the U.S. Census and refer
to expenditure function code 22, “Social Insurance Administration.” Payroll is in $2003.
Table 2. Effect of remote claiming on UI administrative costs.
Log of FTE Fraction of 
Employment Log of Payroll Employment PT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-phone 0.027 0.039 0.030 0.036 0.011 0.013
(0.059) (0.059) (0.064) (0.058) (0.012) (0.009)
Post-Internet 0.032 0.068 0.022 0.058 0.026* 0.025*
(0.057) (0.047) (0.054) (0.045) (0.015) (0.015)
Post-close 0.129** 0.131*** 0.003
(0.054) (0.042) (0.011)
Observations 700 700 700 700 700 700
R-squared 0.967 0.968 0.969 0.969 0.748 0.748
Notes: All regressions include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by state in
parentheses. There are 700 state  year observations, corresponding to 50 states and 14 years (1992 to
2006, excluding 1996). Outcome data are from the Annual Survey of Government Employment and
Payroll collected by the U.S. Census, expenditure function code 22: “Social Insurance Administration.”
* Significant at 90 percent; ** significant at 95 percent; *** significant at 99 percent.
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observation by the number of unemployed persons in that particular state–year. 
UI participation does not increase with the introduction of either phone or Internet
claiming once state and year effects are accounted for, as shown in column (1). The
point estimates are negative and very close to zero, and their precision allows us to
rule out positive effects of 1.7 and 1.5 percentage points at a 95 percent level of con-
fidence for phone and Internet claiming, respectively. If some UI eligibles preferred
making claims in person at UI offices, then phone claiming could actually be asso-
ciated with reduced participation, since phones often replaced the in-person option.
Column (2) includes an indicator for whether UI offices were closed. The coefficients
on phone and Internet claiming increase slightly and are now positive, but still close
to zero. Column (3) includes the real maximum benefit amount (in $100) to account
for any changes in the generosity of the UI system that happen to coincide with the
adoption of remote claiming. The estimated coefficients are unaffected by this inclu-
sion. Column (4) includes controls for various characteristics of the unemployed
population from the CPS, including pre-unemployment average hourly wage, edu-
cation, demographics, and recent labor market experience (weeks worked last year
and weeks looking for work). These controls are generally insignificant, though the
coefficient on weeks spent looking for work is negative, likely reflecting the exhaus-
tion of (and ineligibility for) UI benefits during extended periods of unemployment.
Table 3. Effect of remote claiming on fraction of unemployed on UI.
Fraction of Unemployed on UI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-phone 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Post-Internet 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Post-close 0.011 0.011 0.013
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Max. benefits ($100) 0.004 0.002
(0.013) (0.012)
Average earnings of unemployed ($1000) 0.002***
(0.001)
Percent unemployed female 0.013
(0.034)
Percent unemployed nonwhite 0.039
(0.036)
Percent unemployed college 0.017
(0.051)
Average age of unemployed (10) 0.001
(0.007)
Average weeks worked last year (10) 0.008
(0.007)
Average weeks looking for work (10) 0.024***
(0.008)
Observations 918 918 918 918
R-squared 0.861 0.861 0.862 0.872
Notes: All regressions include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by state in
parentheses. There are 918 state  year observations, corresponding to 51 states (including D.C.) and
18 years (1989 to 2006). Fraction on UI is from administrative records.
* Significant at 90 percent; ** significant at 95 percent; *** significant at 99 percent.
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The positive and significant coefficient on pre-unemployment earnings likely reflects
UI eligibility. Our estimates in this preferred specification allow us to rule out posi-
tive effects of 0.023 and 0.019 percentage points for phone and Internet claiming,
respectively. Since the average participation rate is 36 percent (Table 1), this implies
that we can rule out an impact larger than a 6.4 (5.3) percent increase in participa-
tion in response to the provision of phone (Internet) claiming options (using the 95
percent confidence interval). The standard deviation of the participation rate for UI
by state is 11 percentage points, implying that we can rule out an effect on partici-
pation larger than 21 (19) percent of a standard deviation.
Accounting for Eligibility
While the controls included in specification (4) of Table 3 may partially account for
changes in eligibility, Table 4 offers another approach. In these specifications, we
use the estimated take-up rate as a dependent variable. This is calculated as the
ratio of the fraction of unemployed people on UI (from administrative sources) to
the fraction of unemployed people eligible for UI (estimated from the March CPS).
Table 4. Effect of remote claiming on take-up among UI eligible.
(Fraction of Unemployed on UI)/
(Fraction of Unemployed Eligible for UI)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-phone 0.039 0.009 0.007 0.008
(0.024) (0.033) (0.034) (0.031)
Post-Internet 0.026 0.006 0.008 0.001
(0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.029)
Post-close 0.064* 0.063* 0.064*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.036)
Max. benefits ($100) 0.017 0.024
(0.021) (0.023)
Average earnings of unemployed ($1000) 0.001
(0.004)
Percent unemployed female 0.092
(0.104)
Percent unemployed nonwhite 0.055
(0.137)
Percent unemployed college 0.118
(0.177)
Average age of unemployed (10) 0.037
(0.024)
Average weeks worked last year (10) 0.132***
(0.027)
Average weeks looking for work (10) 0.0131
(0.022)
Observations 918 918 918 918
R-squared 0.735 0.738 0.739 0.757
Notes: All regressions include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by state in
parentheses. There are 918 state  year observations, corresponding to 51 states (including D.C.) and
18 years (1989 to 2006). Fraction on UI is from administrative records. Fraction eligible are estimated
from March CPS; see text for details.
* Significant at 90 percent; ** significant at 95 percent; *** significant at 99 percent.
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We believe that the denominator is estimated with considerable error, introducing
quite a bit of noise into our outcome measure.26 This will decrease our precision
considerably, but should not introduce any systematic bias into our estimates if this
measurement error is uncorrelated with our explanatory variables.
Accounting for eligibility has little effect on our conclusions, though the point
estimate is now negative for phone-based claiming and greater in magnitude. Since
the mean of take-up is a little more than twice as large as the fraction of unem-
ployed on UI, the coefficients should be divided by 2.2 to make them comparable to
Table 3. As expected, standard errors are much larger due to eligibility measure-
ment error. Together with the evidence in Table 3, we conclude that neither phone-
nor Internet-based claiming has an appreciable impact on participation in UI. It
does appear, however, that office closure following the shift to phone claiming is
associated with reduced take-up. We also find weak evidence that increasing the
real maximum benefit amount results in higher participation, though our estimates
are not statistically significant.
Permutation Test for Inference
To test the robustness of our inference for our main specification, we implement a
nonparametric permutation test that assigns placebo patterns of treatment status to
states and uses the empirical distribution of estimated effects from many of these
placebo treatments for inference. This method is discussed by Johnston and
DiNardo (1997, Chapter 11.2) and Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2002) but
has not found widespread use in the difference-in-difference literature.27 The bene-
fit of this approach is that we do not have to specify anything about the structure
of the error term, instead relying on the treatment randomization assumption (con-
ditional on covariates).
To implement the test, we randomly assign each state one of the full treatment
patterns of another state: {PostPhonei,t, PostNeti,t, PostClosei,t}, drawing without
replacement. Since six of the patterns are shared by two states each, there are 51!/26
possible permutations of states with treatments. We then estimate equation (1)
using the placebo treatment patterns with OLSWLS, storing the coefficient esti-
mates âp,j, ân,j, and âc,j, where j denotes the jth randomization. This process is
repeated a large number of times. We define F(.) to be the empirical distribution of
these placebo treatment effect estimates. To test the hypothesis that our estimates
using actual policy dates are statistically different from zero, we observe where they
fall on the F(.) distribution. The 95 percent confidence interval, for instance, is
given by the ân,j that fall between the 0.025 and 0.975 percentiles of F(.).
Figure 9 plots the empirical distribution of âp,j and ân,j using 5,000 randomizations
of treatment assignment. The solid vertical line is the point estimate from the base
preferred model [Table 3, column (4)]. For both phone and Internet claiming, the
point estimate is well within the distribution of point estimates from the placebo
assignments. The 95 percent confidence interval is denoted by the dashed vertical
lines. The width of this confidence interval is very similar to that derived using our
state-clustered standard errors.
Event Study Estimates
In order to identify any preexisting trends in take-up that may bias our difference-
in-difference estimates, we estimated equation (2) both with and without indicators
26 Table A2 in the Appendix presents the correlation between fraction of unemployed on UI and the esti-
mated fraction eligible for UI by year and by state. Go to the publisher’s Web site and use the search
engine to locate the article at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/34787. Overall, the cor-
relation is 0.26, which should be closer to 1 if eligibility were accurately measured.
27 This is a variant of Fisher’s permutation or randomization test (Fisher, 1935). Also see Chetty, Looney,
and Kroft (in press) for a recent application.
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for year relative to office closure. Figure 10 plots the coefficients from these regres-
sions along with 95 percent confidence intervals. For phone claiming, there are no
pre-event trends in participation regardless of whether office closure is controlled
for, and the coefficients lie on the zero line. This suggests that phone claiming 
was implemented during a time that was “typical” for states. There appears to be a
moderate short-term increase in participation following the introduction of phone
claiming, but the estimate of this increase is very imprecise and not different from
zero. Internet claiming, however, may have been implemented during a period 
of atypically low UI participation, as suggested by the negative- and downward-
trending pre-event coefficients. Though the confidence intervals are wide, our
results on Internet claiming should be interpreted with caution. There also appears
to be a short-term increase in participation coinciding with Internet claiming, but
again this increase is not significant at conventional levels.
Other Robustness Checks
Table 5 presents several different checks on the robustness of our main findings
using the fraction of unemployed on UI as our dependent variable. Column (1) just
repeats our preferred base model estimates from Table 3, column (4). In specifica-
tion (2), we include state-specific linear time trends to account for trends at the
state level that are not picked up by aggregate year effects and the time-varying
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Figure 9. Permutation Test for Inference of Main Result.
Notes: Figures plot the empirical distribution of estimated placebo treatment effects from 5,000
randomizations. Solid lines are the empirical 95 percent confidence intervals. Dashed lines are the
actual treatment effect point estimates from Table 3, column (4). See text.
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claiming effects, but both are still insignificant and fall within the original confidence
intervals. In (3) we instead include a linear time trend interacted with baseline demo-
graphic and labor market variables from the 1990 Census: median household
income, fraction rural, fraction nonwhite, fraction with BA, unemployment rate,
and not-in-labor-force rate. This inclusion changes our results very little from the
base case.
Specifications (4) and (5) use alternative methods for identifying the years that
states implemented phone and Internet claiming and closed UI offices. Specifica-
tion (4) restricts analysis to only those states we were able to interview about the
timing of their remote claims. Both coefficients become negative, but we still can-
not reject that they are equal to zero. Identifying policy events as the first year that
phone and Internet claims pass a 5 percent threshold (column 5) produces similar
results as the base case.
The final specifications restrict the sample in different ways. One advantage of the
staggered timing of policy adoption is that treatment effects can be estimated exclu-
sively on the sample of states that adopted the policy, excluding control states that
never adopt. Specifications (6) and (7) use only states that eventually implemented
phone claiming and Internet claiming, respectively. In these specifications, later
adopters serve as controls for earlier adopters. The estimated effects are larger
when the sample is restricted to adopters, particularly for the policy (phone or
Internet) whose enactment the sample is conditioned on, but they are still insignif-
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Figure 10. Event Study Analysis of Fraction of Unemployed on UI.
Notes: Graphs plot coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from WLS estimates of equation (2)
with full controls for covariates, with and without indicators for office closure. See text.
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had not yet implemented phone claiming by 1997. The intent is to estimate the state
fixed effects using pre-treatment data that is closer to the date the policy changes
actually happened. The estimates using this restricted sample are very similar to the
base case.
Effects on UI Recipient Characteristics
If the policy changes affected potential UI recipients differentially—say because
lower-income claimants preferred speaking directly to UI workers or had limited
Internet access—then we may see changes in recipient characteristics even in the
absence of aggregate take-up changes. Table 6 presents regression results where
various characteristics of UI recipients are used as the dependent variables. We
include a full set of controls for characteristics of unemployed people in each
regression. Column (1) examines the fraction of UI recipients that are receiving the
maximum benefit amount. Raising the maximum benefit level mechanically
reduces this fraction. Internet claiming is positively related to the fraction at the
maximum, and the coefficient on Internet claiming is different from zero at the 95
percent level of confidence.
Column (2) examines the fraction of UI recipients who have a college degree. If
college graduates have greater facility with the Internet or easier eligibility determi-
nation over the phone, we may see a shift toward more college graduates following
the adoption of these claiming methods. We find no evidence for such a shift. The
point estimates are close to zero and statistically insignificant. However, we do see a
slight increase in the fraction of college-educated following office closure.
In column (3), we use average real pre-unemployment hourly wage as the
dependent variable. This provides a direct test of the time cost explanation for
incomplete take-up if time spent applying for benefits is more costly to workers
with higher wages. While the positive coefficients on Internet claiming are consis-
tent with this explanation, the estimates are small ($0.08 on a base of $13.83) and
insignificant. If increased convenience primarily affects those whose time is most
valuable, then we may expect to see greater effects higher on the wage distribution.
Columns (4) to (7) address this issue by using different log wage percentiles of UI
recipients as the dependent variable. The estimated effects of introducing phone-
based claiming are consistently negative across the wage distribution. Internet
claiming is, however, associated with higher earnings at the top end of the distri-
bution.
Figure 11 provides graphical evidence on whether the wage distribution of UI
recipients shifted in conjunction with the introduction of remote forms of UI claim-
ing. We first estimate the density of log pre-unemployment real hourly wages for all
UI recipients in all states in 1995, 2000, and 2005 using kernel density estimation
on the BAM micro sample of UI recipients. The left panel plots the change in this
density from 1995 to 2000 for all states and separately by whether states had or had
not yet adopted phone claiming technology by 2000. This was the time period when
more than half of all states did so, but Internet technology was not yet present.
Though the wage distribution of all UI recipients shifted upward, there do not
appear to be differential trends in the earnings distribution by phone claiming
adoption. The right panel plots the change in log wage density from 2000 to 2005
for all states and separately by whether states had adopted Internet claiming tech-
nology by 2005. Again, we see no differential change in the earnings distribution of
UI recipients by states’ claiming technology.
In the context of finding only one significant change in the UI recipient popu-
lation (fraction at maximum benefit amount) with the introduction of remote
claiming, we conclude that increased filing ease had minimal impact on the char-
acteristics of UI recipients.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our analysis suggests that states’ adoption of remote forms of UI claiming (phone
and Internet) did not have an appreciable impact on UI participation and take-up.
At face value, this finding is inconsistent with a time- and transaction-cost expla-
nation for low take-up if remote UI claiming is indeed less time-intensive, as
claimant surveys suggest. However, interpreting our results as a strict rejection of
the time-cost explanation requires that remote claiming reduced transaction costs
considerably relative to expected UI benefits, which may not have been the case. We
can conclude, however, that there are no additional effects of convenience beyond
those obtained from the (small) implicit benefit increase and that the reduced-form
effect of filing technology on participation is low. This latter finding may be of
direct policy relevance as states have increasingly turned to phone- and Internet-
based application procedures for many public benefit programs. For instance, a
recent review found that nearly half of states now accept food stamps applications
at least partially online (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2009).
Our estimates are also sufficiently imprecise that we cannot rule out moderate
effects of a few percentage point increase in take-up rates. Large to moderate effects
for a small population of marginal claimants may not show up in state aggregate
take-up rates. This possibility underscores the importance of testing for heteroge-
neous effects. The evidence on whether claimant characteristics changed with the
advent of remote claiming is also weak. We conclude that the adoption of neither
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Pre-Unemployment Log Hourly Wage of UI Recipients (2003 Dollars)
All States Phone by 2000
No Phone
All States Internet by 2005
No Internet
Figure 11. Change in Pre-Unemployment Wage Density by Policy Adoption.
Notes: Graphs plot changes in wage density estimated from the BAM sample of UI claimants. Kernel den-
sity estimates use the Epanechnikov kernel with optimal bandwidth and were calculated at 100 points.
Weights used in the estimation were calculated using demographic characteristics of all UI claimants.
Nominal wages are deflated by the CPI-U. Observations with real hourly wages greater than $50/hour or
less than $3/hour were set to missing and not used in the estimates.
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One exception is that Internet claiming appears to be associated with greater par-
ticipation by individuals at the top of the wage distribution, who are also more likely
to receive the maximum benefit amount. States appear to have made considerable
changes in administrative procedures and achieved substantial payroll cost reduc-
tions without a measurable impact on UI participation. One implication is that
reducing application barriers alone may not be an effective tool for increasing pro-
gram participation.
This finding differs from that of Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches (2007), who find that
the introduction of electronic tax filing (e-filing) had a large effect on EITC partic-
ipation. We speculate that differences in the role of intermediaries (e-filing occurs
primarily through private tax preparers) and information (e-filing also provides
information about EITC eligibility) may be important contextual differences
between their study and ours. Movement to a system of employer-initiated auto-
matic enrollment in unemployment insurance following job loss may be closer to
the changes they examine than the ones we do and may be expected to have much
larger effects. Future research about the role of program features, information, and
intermediaries in participation is needed. Recent randomized field experiments
funded by H&R Block to test for presentation and inconvenience effects on partic-
ipation in food stamps, federal financial student aid, and several other social pro-
grams holds particular promise.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Dates of changes in claiming method.
Phone Claims Internet Claims Office Closure
State Imputed Interview Imputed Interview Imputed Interview
AK 1997 — 2005 — 1997 —
AL 2002 2002 never never 2003 2002
AR never — 2004 — never —
AZ 2000 — 2005 — 2004 —
CA 1996 — 2002 — 1998 —
CO 1990 1991 2004 2005 1992 1991
CT 2001 2001 never 2005 2003 2001
DC 2000 never 2004 2005 2005 never
DE never never never never never never
FL 2002 — 2002 — 2002 —
GA never never 2002 never never never
HI 2001 — never — 2003 —
IA 1999 — 2005 — never —
ID never — 2002 — 2003 —
IL 1997 — 2005 — never —
IN never — 2003 — never —
KS 1999 — 2002 — 1999 —
KY never — 2004 — 2005 —
LA 2005 — 2004 — never —
MA 1997 1996 never never 1998 never
MD 1997 1997 2002 2002 2000 1997
ME 1997 1997 2005 2006 1998 1997
MI 2003 — 2003 — 2003 —
MN 2000 — 2002 — 1999 —
MO 1996 1997 2002 2003 1998 1997
MS never — never — never —
MT 1997 1997 2004 2005 1998 1997
NC never 2005 never 2003 never never
ND 2000 2001 2005 2004 2002 2001
NE 2001 2001 never 2004 2002 never
NH 2002 never 2002 2002 2004 never
NJ 1999 — 2002 — 2001 —
NM 2002 — 2002 — 2004 —
NV 1998 — 2002 — 2001 —
NY 1999 1998 2002 2001 2001 2002
OH 2001 2002 2004 2004 2002 2003
OK 2000 2000 2004 2004 2005 2003
OR 2004 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005
PA 2000 — 2002 — 2002 —
RI 1997 1998 2002 2002 1999 1999
SC 2004 never 2002 2002 2004 never
SD 2000 — 2005 — 2002 —
TN 2005 2001 never 2003 never never
TX 1998 — 2002 — 2000 —
UT 1997 1997 2004 2000 1999 1997
VA 2004 2003 2002 2002 2006 never
VT 1999 — never — 2000 —
WA 1999 1999 2002 2000 2000 1999
WI 1995 1995 2002 2003 1996 1995
WV never never never never never never
WY 2001 2002 2002 2004 2002 2002
Notes: Policy dates were imputed using the share of claims by filing method. The year in which the
share of claims filed via phone (Internet) accelerated by the greatest amount was designated the event
year. Office closure date was imputed as the first year that in-person claims fell below 20 percent.
Missing values indicate that an interview was not conducted with that state nor was policy informa-
tion found in published sources or news releases.
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Table A2. Correlation between fraction eligible for UI and fraction on UI.
Within year Within state
1989 0.06 AL 0.04 KY 0.30 ND 0.27
1990 0.19 AK 0.10 LA 0.18 OH 0.45
1991 0.02 AZ 0.53 ME 0.08 OK 0.50
1992 0.21 AR 0.23 MD 0.12 OR 0.02
1993 0.19 CA 0.65 MA 0.48 PA 0.60
1994 0.20 CO 0.16 MI 0.35 RI 0.20
1995 0.15 CT 0.20 MN 0.36 SC 0.50
1996 0.27 DE 0.28 MS 0.06 SD 0.19
1997 0.29 DC 0.51 MO 0.17 TN 0.69
1998 0.29 FL 0.34 MT 0.27 TX 0.19
1999 0.14 GA 0.22 NE 0.12 UT 0.49
2000 0.34 HI 0.30 NV 0.45 VT 0.00
2001 0.18 ID 0.22 NH 0.54 VA 0.17
2002 0.24 IL 0.74 NJ 0.41 WA 0.02
2003 0.41 IN 0.10 NM 0.39 WV 0.29
2004 0.35 IA 0.52 NY 0.47 WI 0.06
2005 0.36 KS 0.00 NC 0.21 WY 0.09
2006 0.31
All states, all years: 0.26
Notes: Fraction of unemployed on UI is from DOL administrative records and fraction of unemployed
eligible for UI is estimated by the authors using the March CPS. See text for details on eligibility impu-
tation. These measures were constructed at the state-year level and aggregated to the U.S. using the
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Figure A1. UI Claiming Method by State.
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Figure A2. UI Claiming Method by State (continued).
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Figure A3. UI Claiming Method by State (continued).
